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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FREEDOM OF LIBERTY TAKES ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: AN
ANALYSIS OF ADAMS V. CITY OF BATTLE CREEK, THE CIRCUIT
SPLIT, AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-TERRORISM
LEGISLATION

I. INTRODUCTION
The events of September 11, 2001, permanently changed the lives of every
American and placed the federal government—more now than ever before in
our nation’s history—in the “hot seat” for the responsibility of protecting its
citizens from terrorism. Spurred by the nation’s media, Americans wanted to
know whether the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted
from failures of technology or overly restrictive laws, and if neither, whether
the failures resulted from institutional problems in our nation’s intelligence and
law-enforcement agencies. Congress and President Bush’s anti-terrorism
legislation imposes a great number of changes in our national security policies
and practices, including federal wiretapping regulations.1 However, along with
these heightened security measures also comes the responsibility of heightened
civil liability for individual rights, in particular, the right to privacy.
In the wake of September 11, the country’s attitude toward the
appropriateness of widespread surveillance seems to have drastically changed.2
On the belief that increased surveillance is necessary to prevent similar future
tragedies, President George W. Bush and Congress introduced proposals for
expanding the powers of federal agents in several important respects, including
the authority to conduct electronic surveillance.3 The events of September 11
have also renewed a long-standing national debate about the proper balance

1. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT ACT) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) [herinafter USA PATRIOT ACT].
2. Cf. Neil Munro & Peter H. Stone, A Tougher Balancing Act, 33 NAT’L J. 2852 (2001)
(noting how the terrorist attacks will likely lead to demands for increased law-enforcement
capabilities, particularly in the area of surveillance, and stating that “[privacy] advocates now face
a potentially insurmountable political problem: a wave of public disgust and fear that will likely
help boost police budgets and surveillance authority nationwide”); David Barstow, Envisioning
an Expensive Future in the Brave New World of Fortress New York, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001,
at 16 (discussing how attitudes about security are likely to change).
3. See Jonathan Krim, Anti-Terror Push Stirs Fears for Liberties: Rights Groups Unite To
Seek Safeguards, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A17 (reporting on Attorney General John
Ashcroft’s introduction of a revised and expanded anti-terrorism legislative proposal).
207
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between the government’s powers to maintain order and national security and
its citizens’ Constitutional liberties.
These conflicting views of freedom of liberty verses an individual’s right
to privacy typify the debate over the proper balance between granting the
government authority to maintain order in society and restraining the
government from intruding on personal liberties.4 It is essential that our nation
attempt to find and maintain a proper balance given the potential risks facing
our society, increasingly sophisticated technologies, and our substantial and
growing dependence on those sophisticated technologies. Although the new
anti-terrorism measures are necessary and appropriate in light of the events of
September 11, it is important to bear in mind that the federal government
already possesses substantial power and technologies in those areas.
Underscoring this issue is the recent Second and Seventh Circuit Court
split. The Sixth Circuit in Adams v. City of Battle Creek5 agreed with the
Second Circuit and disagreed with the Seventh Circuit in holding that a
government entity may be liable in a civil suit under the federal wiretap act,
also known as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2522.6 With certain exceptions, the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act criminalizes and creates civil liability for intentionally intercepting
electronic communications without a judicial warrant.7 In Adams, through the
use of a duplicate or “clone” pager and without a warrant, the police
department tapped the plaintiff police officer’s department-provided pager
because the department erroneously thought the officer was assisting drug
dealers.8 In granting summary judgment to defendants, the district court in
Adams held that certain exceptions to the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act applied.9 However, these exceptions—the business use and the law
enforcement exceptions of the Act—required that the clone pager be used in
the ordinary course of police business.10 Adams turns on what is meant by the
Act’s use of the phrase “in the ordinary course of business” to create these two
exceptions to the prohibition against wiretapping.11

4. See United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972)
(“As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms, our task is to examine and balance the
basic values at stake in this case: the duty of Government to protect the domestic security, and the
potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free expression.”).
5. Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2001).
6. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2001).
7. Adams, 250 F.3d at 982.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 980.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 982.
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Section II of this comment will discuss and attempt to explain the case law
history of wiretapping along with new developments in this area of law,
including anti-terrorism legislation. Regrettably, the law surrounding the
Fourth Amendment as applied to electronic surveillance has scarcely kept up
with the today’s technological advances. Section III of this comment will
analyze the Sixth’s Circuit’s decision in Adams, the Second and Seventh
Circuits’ split and how those decisions may affect the federal government’s
liability for heightened wiretapping to prevent terrorism in the United States in
light of the events of September 11. Specifically, Section III will analyze three
of the five major issues in Adams: (1) The meaning of the phrase “other than”
in the federal wiretapping act; (2) exceptions to liability; and (3) municipal
liability under the privacy act.12 Adams’ issues of the Fourth Amendment and
qualified immunity for Defendant Kruithoff are beyond the scope of this
comment and will not be discussed.13
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A.

Governing Law of Wiretapping
1. Case Law

In 1928, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Olmstead v. United States.14
This was its first ruling on the constitutionality of a modern surveillance
technology, namely wiretapping.15 Several states, including Washington—
where Mr. Olmstead and his co-conspirators were conducting an illegal liquor
enterprise—had enacted laws to limit and control wiretapping.16 Federal
agents installed wiretaps on eight of the suspects’ phones and collected
extensive evidence of a large conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition
Act.17 The Court held that wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment
so long as there was no physical invasion of the target’s premises,18 noting the
Fourth Amendment’s reference to “material things”19 and the significance of
physical invasions in prior Fourth Amendment cases.20

12. Id. at 983-86.
13. Id. at 986-87.
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 479-80 & n.13 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (listing state wiretap statutes).
17. Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that the wiretaps spanned nearly five months
and during that time the federal agents accumulated 775 pages of notes on conversations).
18. Id. at 466.
19. Id. at 464 (“The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things - the
person, the house, his papers or his effects.”).
20. Id. at 464-65.
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In 1967 in Berger v. New York,21 the Court found that a New York
eavesdropping statute that authorized electronic surveillance in certain
circumstances failed to particularly describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized, and that it therefore allowed electronic
eavesdropping in a generalized and unconstitutional manner.22 Later that same
year, the Court decided the dividing line case Katz v. United States,23 which
rejected trespass as the dispositive factor in warrantless electronic surveillance
cases and which held that wiretapping was a search under the Fourth
Amendment.24 The Court stated that “the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places,”25 and reasoned that a warrant was required before lawenforcement officers could wiretap telephone calls that Katz was making from
a public pay phone.26
These decisions explain one reason the courts have been reluctant to grant
sweeping authority to law enforcement agencies for electronic surveillance—
the recognition that such surveillance is quite intrusive on an individual’s right
to privacy. Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized the threat to liberty
inherent in electronic surveillance in its decision in Berger.27 The Court
referred to electronic eavesdropping as a “dragnet,” in that all conversations,
even in conversations with persons not even suspected of a crime, would be
swept in.28
2. Title III and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
In passing legislation governing wiretapping, Congress recognized
electronic surveillance techniques are intrusive and can be easily abused. For
over three decades, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 (OCCSSA) has governed electronic surveillance for criminal
investigations.29 Although Title III generally prohibits wiretapping, it creates

21. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
22. Id. at 58-60.
23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24. The Court explained:
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by
our subsequent decisions that the “trespass” doctrine there enunciated can no longer be
regarded as controlling. The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 353.
25. Id. at 351.
26. Id. at 353-357.
27. Berger, 388 U.S. at 84.
28. Id. at 65.
29. 18 U.S.C. §§2510-22 (2001).
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an exception under which law enforcement can legally intercept oral,
electronic, and wire communications in certain limited situations and under
strict constraints.30 In enacting Title III, Congress expressly sought to
accommodate both the need for effective law enforcement and the need to
protect citizens’ right to privacy.31 To keep the wiretap statute current,
Congress has subsequently amended Title III several times, the most
significant of which are the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(“ECPA”)32 and the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of
1994 (“CALEA”),33 making it illegal to intercept communications over
cordless telephones.34
Title III was enacted in response to the Berger and Katz line of cases and
was an attempt to get a handle on the law of wiretapping.35 Title III was later
divided into three sections by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (ECPA).36 The first section governs the interception of communications
(Title I); the second governs stored communications (Title II); and the third
governs pen registers (Title III).37 Title I restricts the government’s use of
electronic surveillance to specific situations and expands the scope of
protection beyond the Fourth Amendment requirements. For example, court
orders for electronic surveillance must be granted only by certain officials,
cannot be granted in situations where other means for obtaining the
information have not been tried and requires probable cause and a specific

30. 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (2001).
31. See 801, 82 Stat. at 211. In enacting Title III, Congress made four findings, the fourth of
which was:
To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral
communications where none of the parties to the communication has consented to the
interception should be allowed only when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction
and should remain under the control and supervision of the authorizing court. Interception
of wire and oral communications should further be limited to certain major types of
offenses and specific categories of crime with assurances that the interception is justified
and that the information obtained thereby will not be misused.
Id. at 211-12.
32. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
33. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994).
34. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 202, 108 Stat. 4279, 4290 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2511 to
include cordless telephones within Title III coverage).
35. See, Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083-1167 at 1138.
36. Amendment to Title III under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Wiretap Act,
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Title I, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2001); Stored
Communications Act, Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Title II, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11
(2000); Pen Register Act, Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2000).
37. 18 U.S.C. §§2510-22, Titles I, II, and III.
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description of the place, time and type of communication to be intercepted.38
Further, electronic surveillance is only permitted for certain crimes and not, for
example, misdemeanors.39 Because the information is stored by a third party,
thereby reducing the expectation of privacy, Title II is much less restrictive.40
Finally, Title III of the ECPA covers pen registers or trap and trace devices,
which track the phone numbers dialed but not the conversations that took
place.41 Previous case law provided that pen registers were not subject to
Fourth Amendment protection because a person had no expectation of privacy
as to the numbers they dialed because they knew the phone company was
tracking the numbers.42 Title III gave very limited protection against pen
registers by forcing the government to obtain a court order prior to use,
although the order is granted on the mere requirement that the use is “relevant
to an ongoing criminal investigation.”43
3. FISA: Wiretapping and Interception of Electronic Communications
As apart from domestic crime, the U.S. government needed measures to
protect itself and its citizens from foreign intelligence and terrorism. Hence,
Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”)44
in response to remaining questions about whether surveillance by executive
agencies in carrying out their national-defense function were covered by Title
III.
FISA allows the government’s executive branch to conduct wiretapping for
national security purposes but still requires authorization to conduct such
surveillance.45 Requests for wiretaps are reviewed by a seven-member special
court (the FISA court) under which the Attorney General must show probable
cause for believing that the wiretap is for intelligence purposes.46 No
requirement for probable cause for suspecting the commission of a crime was
required under FISA, however.47 This made the standard for obtaining a

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (D. Kan. 2000), in which an
internet provider allowed the government access to a subscriber’s computer, leading to the
discovery of his possession of child pornography. The search was upheld due to the defendant
knowingly revealing his IP address to the internet provider. Id. at 1110.
41. 18 U.S.C. §2510-22, Title III.
42. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2000).
44. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 1801-1863 (2000).
[hereinafter FISA].
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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warrant under FISA lower than obtaining a wiretap for law-enforcement
purposes.48
Along the same lines, the Supreme Court held in United States v. United
States District Court49 (commonly known as Keith) that the interposition of a
judge was necessary for surveillance by executive-branch intelligence agencies
for domestic national security.50 This decision did not mandate the application
of Title III procedures for such surveillance for domestic national security,51
and invited Congress to construct other protective procedures.52 Although the
president’s powers are at their greatest when acting for national security, in
light of abuses by federal intelligence agencies, Congress requires the president
to get a surveillance order to conduct a wiretap for national security purposes.53
While the standard for getting a surveillance order to wiretap for intelligence
purposes is lower than a surveillance order for law-enforcement purposes,54
Congress has sought to require some level of accountability of intelligence
agents.
In addition, as opposed to the requirements under other wire tap acts,55
there is no notice requirement under FISA.56 Surveillance under FISA can last
from 90 days to a year. Targets of FISA surveillance may find it difficult to
challenge the legality of the surveillance because the application for the
surveillance is sealed and not available during discovery.57 For all of these
reasons, FISA surveillance is considerably friendlier to government than the
surveillance under the ECPA.
To balance the potential for abuse,58 Congress set forth several procedural
safeguards. FISA requires probable cause for believing that a U.S. citizen was
an agent of a foreign power—that is, one knowingly engaged in covert
intelligence gathering activities, prior to surveillance.59 By limiting the strong
FISA provisions to this narrow purpose, Congress achieved a balance between

48. Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
49. United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
50. Id. at 323-24.
51. Id. at 322 (“We do not hold that the same type of standards and procedures prescribed by
Title III are necessarily applicable to this case.”).
52. Id. (“Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from
those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III.”).
53. FISA, supra note 44.
54. Id.
55. See infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
56. FISA, supra note 44.
57. Id.
58. FISA of 1978 was enacted in the wake of the Watergate scandal, which eroded the trust
of the American people in the executive branch.
59. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2000).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

214

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:207

national security and individual rights.60 Further, FISA limited electronic
surveillance to situations where the “sole or main purpose” of the surveillance
was to gather foreign intelligence information.61 Minimization procedures are
also provided by FISA to reduce the probability that the information sought is
necessary for the investigation.62
Still, there exists the possibility that the government could attempt to find a
way around these limitations by concealing a criminal investigation in the
cloak of foreign intelligence. Courts reviewing evidence gathered using a
FISA search repeatedly upheld the primary purpose requirement, although
some courts refuse to draw a distinction between foreign intelligence crimes
and ordinary criminal activities.63 In response to these court decisions, in 1995
the Attorney General adopted Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and
the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign
These procedures limited contact
Counterintelligence Investigations.64
between the CIA, which in its charter is barred from engaging in internal
security functions (domestic security),65 and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
This separation was an attempt to prevent the investigation from appearing or
actually becoming a criminal investigation, by preventing the Criminal
Division from “directing or controlling” the investigation.66
4. Legislative Proposals After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11
Shortly after the attacks of September 11, there was a inundation of legislative
measures aimed at combating terrorism.67 The foremost issue Congress was
concerned with was the lack of communication between the FBI and law
enforcement agencies—due to the fact that it was collectively thought that the
attacks could have been averted with appropriate collaboration. Alarmed by
this haste and lack of thoughtful deliberation,68 legislators and advocacy

60. Id.
61. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2000).
62. Id.
63. See United States v. Sarkinssian, 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. 1995 Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning
Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Couterintelligence Investigations.
65. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1)(2000).
66. Id.
67. On September 13, the Senate attached an amendment, entitled the Combating Terrorism
Act of 2001, to an appropriations bill for the Justice Department. See Senate Amendment 1562,
147 Cong. Rec. S9401 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2001). Attorney General John Ashcroft introduced a
more comprehensive legislative agenda, which included nearly identical provisions to Senate
Amendment 1562, the Combating Terrorism Act. See Krim, supra note 3.
68. Congress was pressured to act quickly on the bill submitted by Attorney General
Ashcroft. See Krim, supra note 3 (“The White House is pushing for Capitol Hill to act by the end
of the week, according to a congressional source.”).
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groups, both traditionally liberal and conservative,69 challenged the wisdom,
motives and the constitutionality of certain legislative provisions.
Nevertheless, in less than two months, Congress enacted and President Bush
signed into law the USA Patriot Act70 with overwhelming support.71
The USA Patriot Act72 altered the administrative functioning of several
other legislative acts, including OCCSSA and FISA. The most relevant
changes include Title II, “Enhanced Surveillance Procedures.”73 This Title
allows the sharing of evidence between law enforcement officers and the CIA
and includes an expanded role for the Director of the CIA in FISA
investigations.74 The USA Patriot Act further limits judicial oversight of
electronic surveillance, allowing roving wiretaps and warrants without
particulars, including the name and place to be searched.75 Most relevant to the
FISA court authorization, however, was the change of the “sole or main
purpose” language in FISA to “significant purpose,”76 a move that lowers the
burden for the government.
The USA Patriot Act also contains several provisions that significantly
changed the law regarding the government’s ability to conduct surveillance.77
First, the USA Patriot Act makes terrorism a predicate act for which a wiretap
under Title III of OSSCA can be authorized.78 Second, it modified Title III,
FISA and the federal statute related to pen registers (a close cousin to wiretaps
and “bugs,” which collects information about telephone calls placed to and
from a target telephone, such as the telephone numbers dialed, the duration,
and the time, for use in investigations and prosecutions of crimes) so that there
would be explicit legal authorization to permit surveillance of e-mail and
Internet communications.79 Third, the Act authorizes the use of a “roving

69. See Krim, supra note 3 (“A coalition of public interest groups from across the political
spectrum has formed to try to stop Congress and the Bush administration from rushing to enact
counterterrorism measures before considering their effect on Americans’ privacy and civil
rights.”).
70. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1.
71. Jonathan Krim & Robert O’Harrow Jr., Bush Signs into Law New Enforcement Era: U.S.
Gets Broad Electronic Powers, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001, at A6.
72. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1.
73. USA Patriot Act, supra note 1, at § 203(b).
74. Id.
75. Id. at § 216(a).
76. Id. at § 218.
77. Krim, supra note 69.
78. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 201.
79. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at §§ 214, 216.
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wiretap” under FISA.80 Fourth, the Act lowers the threshold for which
surveillance pursuant to FISA is permitted,81 and expands the time-periods for
which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court can authorize surveillance in
the United States of “an agent of foreign power.”82 Fifth, the Act allows for
so-called “sneak-and-peak warrants,” which permit law-enforcement officers
to delay notifying a target that a search or seizure has been conducted.83 Sixth,
the Act also lowers the firewalls that have been erected between lawenforcement and national-security agencies, by permitting greater sharing of
information gained through surveillance.84 Finally, the Act subjects several
provisions to a four-year sunset.85
In response to the passage of the Patriot Act, the Attorney General
approved new Intelligence Sharing Procedures to replace the 1995
Procedures.86 Under the new procedures, the “direction and control” test was
abandoned in favor of a complete exchange of information between

80. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 206. The “roving wiretap” can now be obtained
upon a showing that “the actions of the target of the application may have the effect of thwarting
the identification of a specified person.” Id.
81. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 218.
82. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 207.
83. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 213 (statement of Patrick Leahy). Senator
Leahy explained sneak-and-peak warrants as follows:
Two circuit courts of appeal, the Second and the Ninth Circuits, have recognized a
limited exception to this requirement [that a person be notified of a search]. When
specifically authorized by the issuing judge or magistrate, the officers may delay
providing notice of the search to avoid compromising an ongoing investigation or for
some other good reason. However, this authority has been carefully circumscribed.
First, the Second and Ninth Circuit cases have dealt only with situations where the
officers search a premises without seizing any tangible property. . . .
Second, the cases have required that the officers seeking the warrant must show good
reason for the delay. Finally, while the courts have allowed notice of the search may be
delayed, it must be provided within a reasonable period thereafter, which should generally
be no more than seven days. . . .
The bill prohibits the government from seizing any tangible property or any wire or
electronic communication or stored electronic information unless it makes a showing of
reasonable necessity for the seizure. . . . Second, the provision now requires that notice be
given within a reasonable time of the execution of the warrant rather than giving a blanket
authorization for up to a 90-day delay. What constitutes a reasonable time, of course, will
depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. But I would expect courts to be
guided by the teachings of the Second and the Ninth Circuits that, in the ordinary case, a
reasonable time is no more than seven days.
Id. at S11002-03.
84. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 203(b)-(d).
85. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 224.
86. Intelligence Sharing Procedures, March 6, 2002.
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intelligence and law enforcement.87 Further, the Procedures requested that the
FISA court remove the minimization procedures in all cases.88
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Adams v. City of Battle Creek

Adams v. City of Battle Creek89 was brought under the federal wiretapping
act known as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102522.90 With certain exceptions, the federal wiretapping act criminalizes and
creates civil liability for intentionally intercepting electronic communications
without a judicial warrant.91 Adams raises the question of whether a police
department may tap a police officer’s pager without a warrant or notice to the
officer.92
David Adams, a City of Battle Creek police officer, brought suit against
the city and a police department employee under § 1983 and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, alleging that interception of pages he received
over a department-issued pager through use of duplicate or “clone” pager
violated his rights.93 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary
judgment to defendants; Adams appealed.94 The Court of Appeals, held that:
(1) warrantless interception of pages was not made in ordinary course of police
department’s business, and thus did not come within exception to Act’s
prohibition on interception of electronic communications; (2) governmental
entities may be held liable for violations of Act; (3) the court would decline to
reach constitutional issues raised; and (4) factual issues as to whether city
could be held liable, and whether department employee was protected by
qualified immunity, precluded summary judgment.95 The case was affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded.96
In Adams, it is both clear and accepted that the definition of “intercept” in
the Act includes pagers within the language “acquisition of the contents of
any . . . electronic . . . device.”97 The statutes’ definition section for “electronic

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
250 F.3d 980.
Id. at 982.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 980.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 982.
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device” creates two “in-the-ordinary-course-of-business” exceptions to wiretap
liability.98 The scope and meaning of these two exceptions are in need of
interpretation, because the two exceptions are not exactly clear:99
(5) “electronic, mechanical, or other device” means any device or apparatus
which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other
than (a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any
component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of
wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its
business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course
of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the
facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or
(ii) being used by a provider of wire of electronic communication service
in the ordinary course of business, or by an investigative or law
enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties.100

The first problem the Court found is what the underlined phrase “other
than” (normally an adverbial phrase) is supposed to modify.101 The Court
questioned whether it modifies the immediately preceding action “to intercept
[an] . . . electronic device,” or whether it acts as an adjective, modifying
“device or apparatus” or does it modify some other action or thought not
expressed in clear language.102 The second problem the Court found is
whether the use of “in-the-ordinary-course-of-business” language, as an
exception, implies, and therefore means, that the tapping of the communication
is so routine, customary or well accepted that the parties to the tapped
communication would, should or did know of the tap.103 The court in Adams
dealt with these two issues of interpretation as set out below.
1. The Meaning of the Phrase “Other Than”

The Court found that there is no discussion in the case law of what the
phrase “other than” in the statutory definition of “electronic, mechanical or
other device” is to modify.104 The Adams court stated that its dictionary label
as an adverbial phrase indicates that it is to modify the immediately preceding
verb phrase “to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication,” and found
that this does not make sense when read with the language that follows it.105
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (2001) (emphasis added).
Adams, 250 F.3d at 983.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Court reasoned that if “other than” modifies “used to intercept . . .
electronic communication, “the scope of the “other than” exception would be
as broad as the statute itself.106 Therefore, this means that “other than” must
modify the nouns “device or apparatus.”107 The language immediately
following “other than” is “any telephone or telegraph, or any component
thereof,” all of which are also nouns.108 The Court reasoned that a better word
choice than the “other than” phrase probably would have been “excluding”
because subparts (a) and (b) to § 2510 (5) are exclusions to the main
definition.109 The Court noted that the cases discussing these exceptions apply
“other than” this way, and it is the only way that makes sense.110
2. In the Ordinary Course Exceptions to Liability

The Court in Adams concluded that the exceptions to liability do not apply
to this case, and held that both the “ordinary course of business” exception, or
“business use” exception as it is also called, as well as the law enforcement
exception, require that the interception of a communication be undertaken by
employers or law enforcement agencies in the ordinary course of their
businesses using equipment provided by a communications carrier as part of
the communications network.111 The Court stated that for this exception to
apply, a court must find, first, that the equipment used to make the interception
be “furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic
communication service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by
the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business . . .§
2510(5)(a)(i).”112 Although the plaintiff raised the issue of whether a clone
pager fits within the definition prescribed in the exception, the Court found it
clear that the clone pager, a piece of electronic communication equipment, was
provided to the City by MobileComm, a Bell South company, in the ordinary
course of its business as a provider of wire and electronic communication
services.113 The Court found, as did the district court, that the first part of the
exception is met.114
The Court held that the second part of the exception requires that the clone
pager be used in “the ordinary course” of the police department’s business.115

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 983-84.
Id. at 984.
Id.
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“Ordinary course of business” is not defined in the statute, but generally
requires that the use be (1) for a legitimate business purpose, (2) routine and
(3) with notice.116 The Court noted there is some disagreement in the case law
about whether “covert” monitoring can ever be in the “ordinary course of
business.”117 Although the Court did not find that the statute requires actual
consent for the exception to apply, the Court held that monitoring in the
ordinary course of business requires notice to the person or persons being
monitored.118 The Court held that, because it is undisputed that plaintiff was
not given any notice that his pager was being monitored, the exceptions cannot
apply.119
Most courts interpreting these exceptions have held that advance notice in
some form is necessary.120 “What is ordinary is apt to be known; it imports
implicit notice.”121 In Amati v. City of Woodstock,122 employees and former
employees of a police department, along with friends and family members,
brought an action against the city, the former police chief, and other members
of the police department under the federal electronic-eavesdropping statute,
based on alleged taping of plaintiffs’ personal telephone calls.123 The court
held that the recording of all calls to and from a police department was routine
police practice and, thus, took place in the ordinary course of a law
enforcement officer’s duties for purpose of the exception to liability under the
federal electronic-eavesdropping statute, regardless of whether police
employees were aware that particular line was being taped (emphasis
added).124
In Bohach v. City of Reno,125 claiming violations of the Fourth Amendment
and the wiretap statutes, police officers sought to halt an investigation into
their alleged misuse of the department’s computerized paging system. The
police department was retrieving stored messages generated by their pagers.126
The court held that the officers had no reasonable expectation of privacy when
the police department warned pager users in advance that their messages would
be logged on the network.127 The court noted that the police officers did not
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 985,
120 S. Ct. 445.
122. Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 955.
125. Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996).
126. Id. at 1233.
127. Id. at 1235.
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have reasonable expectation of privacy in their use of the computerized paging
system because all messages were recorded and stored.128 Storage of the
messages was not due to anyone “tapping” the system but was simply an
integral part of the technology, which stored messages in central computer
until they were retrieved by, or sent to, the intended recipient.129 Transmission
from a user’s keyboard to a computer was essentially electronic mail.130 The
police chief had notified all users that their messages would be “logged on the
network,” that certain types of messages were banned from the system, and
that police stations often record all outgoing and incoming telephone calls.131
In Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp.,132 the Fourth Circuit held that recording
all telephone conversations on certain lines after bomb threats were received
by the company was not in the ordinary course of business where the
employees did not receive notice of the recording.133 The court further held
that there was no unlawful “interception” of a security officer’s conversations
during the period after the corporation that retained the security firm turned off
the voice logger on telephone lines with extensions in the security office, even
though, due to a design defect, a handset microphone remained able to pick up
ambient noise in the guards’ office and transmit it to the corporation’s security
control room where employees did not receive notice of the recording.134
The Sixth Circuit in Adams v. City of Battle Creek agreed with the Second
Circuit and disagreed with the Seventh Circuit in holding that a government
entity may be liable in a civil suit under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522. The
defendants in Adams did not routinely monitor officers’ pagers nor give notice
to officers that random monitoring of their department-issued pagers was
possible.135 The Court disagreed with defendants to the extent that they
contend that Adams impliedly consented to the interception of his pages by the
clone pager simply because he accepted and used a department-issued pager.136
The Court stated that the general policy of the department that departmentissued equipment, which includes the pager, was not to be “converted to
personal use” cannot provide the necessary notice to officers to find consent to
surreptitious interception of their messages by clone pagers.137 The Court went
on to state that the so-called policy prohibiting personal use cannot form an

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1234-35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 739.
Id. at 742.
Adams, 250 F.3d at 984.
Id.
Id.
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after-the-fact justification for intercepting plaintiff’s pager where the policy
had not been enforced and the department conceded it was aware that pagers
were used by many members of the force for personal use.138
The Court did not find any need under the facts presented in this case to
analyze the “business use” and “law enforcement” exceptions separately.139
The Court noted that Congress most likely carved out an exception for law
enforcement officials to make clear that the routine and almost universal
recording of phone lines by police departments and prisons, as well as other
law enforcement institutions, is exempt from the statute.140 Such a system
routinely and indiscriminately records all phone activity in and out of the
police department.141 This practice is well known in the industry and in the
general public, and the courts have ruled that even prisoners are entitled to
some form of notice that such conversations may be monitored or recorded.142
This point is illustrated in United States v. Paul.143 In Paul, defendants
were convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, impart based on evidence of their phone conversations, under a
statute making it unlawful for anyone to introduce, on the grounds of a federal
prison, anything contrary to the rule of the Attorney General, and they
appealed.144 The Court of Appeals held that where monitoring of telephone at
prison took place pursuant to policy statement issued by Federal Bureau of
Prisons as well as local prison rules, telephone rules were posted, and prison
inmates had reasonable notice that monitoring of their conversations might
occur, monitoring took place within ordinary course of correctional officer’s
duties and was permissible under exception to Title III, permitting interception
of communications over equipment used by an investigative or law
enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties and therefore trial court
did not err in refusing to suppress testimony regarding such monitored
telephone conversations.145
Also illustrating this point is United States v. Daniels,146 wherein the court
held that the provision of the criminal code allowing wiretapping by an
investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing First v. Stark Cnty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 2000 WL 1478389 (6th Cir. Oct. 4,
2000)).
141. Adams, 250 F.3d at 984.
142. Id. (citing United States v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Daniels,
902 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987)).
143. United States v. Paul, 614 F.2d (6th Cir. 1980).
144. Id. at 115-16.
145. Id. at 116-17.
146. United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1990).
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allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to record an inmate’s telephone
calls from jail, during which the inmate conducted an illegal enterprise. Thus,
evidence obtained by recording did not have to be suppressed in criminal
trial.147 Further, in United States v. Amen,148 the court held that (1) Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act dealing with wiretapping
applies to prison monitoring; (2) inmates impliedly consented to interception
of their telephone calls by using prison telephones when they were on notice of
the prison’s interception policy from at least four sources; (3) taping of
telephone conversations made by prison inmates did not violate the Fourth
Amendment; (4) prison inmates have no reasonable expectation of privacy;
and (5) in the prison context, the reasonableness of this search is directly
related to legitimate concerns for institutional security.149
3. Municipal Liability Under the Privacy Act

In Adams, the plaintiff sought to hold both the City and a police
department employee liable under the wiretapping act.150 The defendants
raised the question of whether the City is a “person” for purposes of the Act.151
The Court answered that question by noting that the statute defines “person” as
“any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political
subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock
company, trust or corporation.”152
The Adams court noted that the provision of the Act providing for civil
liability, § 2520,153 was amended in 1987 and made part of the 1986 Privacy
Act.154 The amendment added the words “or entity” to those who may be held
liable under the Act.155 The addition of the words “entity” can only mean a
governmental entity because prior to the 1986 amendments, the definition of
“person” already included business entities.156 In order for the term not to be
redundant, the term “entity” necessarily means governmental entities.157 The
147. Id. at 1245.
148. United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1987).
149. Id. at 378-80.
150. Adams, 250 F.3d at 984.
151. Id. at 985.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2001) provides:
Except as provided in § 2511(2)(ii), any person whose wire, oral or electronic
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter
may in a civil action recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation
such relief as may be appropriate.
155. Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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Court noted in support of this view that the amendment added the same
language to the civil liability provision for interception of stored wire and
electronic communications under 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a).158 The Court noted that
the Senate Committee Report summarizing § 2707, the parallel section for
liability for intercepting stored communications, specifically states that the
word “entity” includes governmental entities.159
The Court based its decision on the amendments to the statute and the
legislative history behind them, as well as the case law considering the issue, in
holding that governmental entities may be liable under 18 U.S.C. § 2520.160
The Court, in finding that a municipality may be liable under the Act,
concluded that questions of material fact still remain as to who was involved in
authorizing the interception and how it arose.161 The Court held that summary
judgment was not appropriate on this issue at that time because the facts were
undeveloped, and remanded the case to the district court for further
development of this issue.162
B.

Sixth Circuit’s Dissent in Adams

Circuit Judge Krupansky concurred in part and dissented in part.163 The
panel majority reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
defendant-appellees, finding that the electronic monitoring at issue in this case
did not fall within one of the statutory exclusions provided by the federal
wiretapping laws.164 In so doing, Judge Krupansky noted, the panel majority
disregarded the plain language of the controlling statute by imputing a notice
requirement into the ordinary course of business and law enforcement tests of
the federal wiretapping laws.165
Circuit Judge Krupansky noted that David Adams had served as a law
enforcement officer166 for the City of Battle Creek Police Department since
1986.167 In conjunction with his position as a law enforcement officer, Adams
was assigned an alphanumeric pager.168 The police department had given
Adams a copy of departmental policy which indicated “Department issued
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3597.
161. Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
162. Id. at 985-86.
163. Id. at 987.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. David Adams served as a patrolman until 1993 when promoted to the position of
detective.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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equipment, supplies and uniforms, will at no time be converted [to] personal
use.”169 The police department had notified Adams that “[it was] the policy of
the Police Department to perform regular audits and inspections of all
department issues equipment.170 These inspections ensure proper maintenance
and use of all department equipment and supplies.”171 Numerous allegations
of complicity in drug activity have marked his tenure: (1) in 1989, his patrol
partner was charged with drug trafficking; (2) a number of informants alleged
that Adams had protected drug dealers; and (3) Adams had appeared to
maintain a close friendship with a local drug dealer.172 However, investigators
had failed to surface substantial evidence of wrongdoing by Adams.173
Circuit Judge Krupansky dissented because he was persuaded that the
officers of the City of Battle Creek Police Department monitored David
Adams’ use of his alphanumeric pager in the ordinary course of its business
according to the exception in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i), and in the ordinary
course of exercising their law enforcement duties according to the exception in
18 U.S.C. § 2510 (5)(a)(ii).174
C. The Second Circuit’s Analysis
Most courts addressing the issue have held that the 1986 amendments
indicate that a governmental entity may be liable in a civil suit under the
Act.175 In Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United States Department of Justice, bank
account holders victimized by government seizure of numerous electronic fund
transfers brought suit against the government and various banks.176 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the
complaint in its entirety.177 The Court of Appeals held that: (1) government
entities could be liable for violating the statute regulating access to stored
electronic information, and (2) remand would be required for additional fact
determinations as to whether government had been liable in present case.178
The Court in Organizacion stated that the government did not violate
Electronic Communications Privacy Act by seizing electronic wire transfers of

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6)(2001); see also Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United States Dep’t of
Justice, 18 F.3d 91, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1994); Conner v. Tate, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2001);
PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dep’t, 832 F. Supp. 808, 822-23 (D.N.J. 1993).
176. Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United States Dept. of Justice, 18 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1994).
177. Id. at 93.
178. Id. at 93-94.
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funds claimed to have been obtained from illegal drug transactions and held
that no required “interception” had occurred because no “device” as defined
under Act had been used.179 The court also held that government entities are
subject to liability under the statute regulating access to certain stored
electronic records.180
In Conner v. Tate,181 a citizen brought an action against a county, county
officers and woman who allegedly unlawfully accessed and taped private
telephone and voice mail communications between the citizen and the
woman’s former husband, seeking damages for alleged violations of federal
and state wiretap statutes and Electronic Communications Privacy Act.182 The
county moved to dismiss, and county officers moved for partial judgment on
the pleadings.183 The district court held that governmental entities are
amenable to suit under the civil liability provisions of federal wiretap statutes
and Electronic Communications Privacy Act authorizing civil damages for
unlawful interception, disclosure or use of wire, oral or electronic
communications.184
The court held that as defined in federal wiretap statutes, the term “person”
does not include governmental agencies, and therefore government entity
cannot be prosecuted criminally for violation of wiretap statutes and that the
statutory language is the starting point for interpreting the meaning of a
statute.185 If the statutory language being interpreted is ambiguous, the court
may look to the legislative history and the overall statutory scheme.186
The court went on to state that a county could be held civilly liable for
violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.187 The court held that
the complaint failed to state a civil damages claim against the county for
violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, given that the complaint
did not allege that the county accessed the electronic communication service
illegally, and allegations that a third party somehow obtained capability to
access and record messages from voice mail systems and pager memories of
the plaintiff and the third-party’s husband did not permit inference that access
was acquired with assistance of county police officers to whom recordings
were later allegedly disclosed.188

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 94.
Id. at 94-95.
Conner v. Tate, 130 F. Supp. 3d 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
Id. at 1373.
Id.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1374-75.
Id. at 1375.
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In PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Department,189 the police
officers union and individual officers sued the township, township police
department, former and current police directors, former mayor and the
telephone company alleging that electronic listening and taping devices were
covertly placed in certain areas of police headquarters and on building phone
lines resulting in unlawful interception of police officers’ private conversations
in violation of United States Constitution, New Jersey and Federal Wiretap
Acts, and New Jersey common law.190 On defendants’ motions for summary
judgment, the district court held that: (1) the police officers did not have
reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations which took place over
“beeped” telephone lines; (2) the police officers could not recover damages for
humiliation, mental pain and anguish under New Jersey Tort Claims Act; (3)
the union had no standing to bring claim; and (4) the police director was a
“policy-making official” for purposes of municipal liability under § 1983.191
The district court held that telephone conversations which were recorded
covertly in police headquarters were “wire communications,” within the
meaning of both the Federal Wiretap Act and the New Jersey Wiretap Act, and
thus, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard did not govern claims;
wire communications, unlike oral communications, were generally protected
regardless of whether the person making or receiving such communications
had an expectation of privacy.192 The court stated that the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard of Katz193 was highly relevant to claimed
interceptions of the police officers’ oral conversations by means of
surreptitious recording in police headquarters in violation of both Federal and
New Jersey Wiretap Acts.194 “Person,” in the definitional section of the federal
wiretap statute, includes government employees but does not include
governmental bodies themselves.195 “Entity,” within the meaning of the federal
wiretap statute authorizing recovery from a person or entity that violates
statute, refers to governmental entities; thus, governmental entities such as the
township and police department were subject to liability under the Federal
Wiretap Act.196 “Person,” within the meaning of the New Jersey Wiretap Act,
does not include governmental bodies; thus, the township and police
department could not be subject to liability under the New Jersey Wiretap

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dep’t, 832 F. Supp. 808 (D.N.J. 1993).
Id. at 814.
Id. at 819-24.
Id. at 819.
Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
PBA Local No. 38, 832 F. Supp. at 819.
Id. at 822-23.
Id. at 823.
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Act.197 Lastly, the court stated that in determining what construction to give to
the New Jersey Wiretap Act, the court must weigh the fact that the Act was
closely modeled after and made to substantially parallel the Federal Wiretap
Act.198
D. The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis
Only the Seventh Circuit has ruled to the contrary, holding that a
governmental entity may not be found liable in a civil suit under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.199 In Amati v. City of Woodstock,200 the court
based its hasty decision to exempt governmental entities from liability under
the Act solely on the plain language of the definition of “person” in the statute,
which does not expressly include governmental entities.201 The court did not
deal with the meaning of the word “entity.”202 Finding no ambiguity, the court
refused to look to the legislative history.203 However, the court in Adams
looked to the legislative history in order to give meaning to the word “entity,”
which was added to the definition in 1987.204
The Amati court specifically held the following: (1) Exception to liability
under federal electronic-eavesdropping statute that exists for eavesdropping by
an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties
is not limited to situations in which express notice is given to people whose
conversations are being listened to;205 (2) for purpose of the exception to
liability under federal electronic-eavesdropping statute that exists for
eavesdropping by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary
course of his duties, the term “ordinary” is properly interpreted to refer to
routine noninvestigative recording of telephone conversations, not to use of
wiretapping that occurs in furtherance of an investigation;206 (3) recording of
all calls to and from the police department was routine police practice and thus
took place in the ordinary course of a law enforcement officer’s duties for the
purpose of exception to liability under the federal electronic-eavesdropping
statute, regardless of whether police employees were aware that particular line
was being taped;207 (4) the federal electronic-eavesdropping statute does not

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
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Id. at 823-24.
Id. at 824.
Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
Id. (citing Amati, 176 F.3d at 956); see supra notes 121 and 122 and accompanying text.
Adams, 350 F.3d at 985.
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forbid all nonconsensual electronic eavesdropping, but it does require a
warrant for electronic eavesdropping that is not within one of the exclusions;208
and (5) the federal electronic-eavesdropping statute does not allow for suits
against municipalities.209
E.

Author’s Analysis

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act seeks to balance citizens’
privacy rights and law enforcement needs while keeping in mind the
protections of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and
seizure.210 Congress has made the Act the primary means by which to address
violations of privacy interests in the communications field.211 Bearing this in
mind, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Adams, Second
Circuit and Seventh Circuit’s decisions may have grayed the lines defining this
balance—especially in light of the consequences of Congress and President
Bush’s new anti-terrorism legislation.
The Sixth Circuit in Adams correctly agreed with the Second Circuit and
correctly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit in holding that a government
entity may be liable in a civil suit under the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act. The Court properly found that Adams turns on what is meant
when the Act uses the phrase “in the ordinary course of business” to create two
exceptions to the prohibition against wiretapping.212 The Court’s reasoning that
the statutes’ definition section for “electronic device” creates two “in-theordinary-course-of-business” exceptions to wiretap liability213 was correct. In
finding that the exceptions do not apply to this case, the court correctly held
that both the “ordinary course of business” exception and the law enforcement
exception require that the interception of a communication be undertaken by
employers or law enforcement agencies in the ordinary course of their
businesses using equipment provided by a communications carrier as part of
the communications network.214 The Court relied on the fact that “ordinary
course of business” is not defined in the statute, but generally requires that the
use be (1) for a legitimate business purpose, (2) routine, and (3) with notice.215
Adams’ majority correctly reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the defendant-appellees, finding that the electronic monitoring at
issue in this case did not fall within one of the statutory exclusions provided by
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
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the federal wiretapping laws.216 In so doing, the panel majority disregarded the
plain language of the controlling statute by imputing a notice requirement into
the ordinary course of business and law enforcement tests of the federal
wiretapping laws.217
Circuit Judge Krupansky dissent is not persuasive in that he argued that he
was convinced that the officers of the City of Battle Creek Police Department
monitored David Adams’ use of his alphanumeric pager in the ordinary course
of its business and in the ordinary course of exercising their law enforcement
duties.218
The majority of the courts addressing this issue in the Second Circuit have
correctly held that the 1986 amendments indicate that a governmental entity
may be liable in a civil suit under the Act.219 Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United
States Department of Justice220 held government entities could be liable for
violating the statute regulating access to stored electronic information.221 In
Conner v. Tate,222 the district court held that governmental entities are
amenable to suit under the civil liability provisions of federal wiretap statutes
and Electronic Communications Privacy Act authorizing civil damages for
unlawful interception, disclosure or use of wire, oral or electronic
communications.223 The court held that as defined in federal wiretap statutes
the term “person” does not include governmental agencies, and therefore a
government entity cannot be prosecuted criminally for violation of wiretap
statutes.224 Conner held that a court may look to the legislative history and the
overall statutory scheme if the statutory language being interpreted is
ambiguous.225 In PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Department,226 held
that “entity,” within the meaning of the federal wiretap statute authorizing
recovery from a person or entity that violates the statute, refers to
governmental entities; thus, governmental entities such as a township and a
police department were subject to liability under the Federal Wiretap Act.227

216. Id. at 984.
217. Id. at 987.
218. Id.
219. See Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 18 F.3d 91, 94-95 (2d Cir.
1994); Conner v. Tate, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2001); PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge
Police Dep’t, 832 F. Supp. 808, 822-23 (D.N.J. 1993).
220. Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 18 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1994).
221. Id. at 94-95.
222. Conner v. Tate, 130 F. Supp. 3d 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
223. Id. at 1375.
224. Id. at 1374-75.
225. Id. at 1375.
226. PBA Local No. 38, 832 F. Supp. at 814.
227. Id. at 823.
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Only the Seventh Circuit has ruled to the contrary in that it indicates that a
governmental entity may not be held liable in a civil suit under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.228 In Amati v. City of Woodstock,229 the court
based its hasty decision to exempt governmental entities from liability under
the Act solely on the plain language of the definition of “person” in the statute,
which does not expressly include governmental entities.230 The court did not
deal with the meaning of the word “entity.”231 Finding no ambiguity, the court
incorrectly refused to look to the legislative history.232 Is this to say the
Seventh Circuit believes the government is above the law?
In opposition to Amiti, the court in Adams looked to the legislative history
in order to give meaning to the word “entity,” which was added to the
definition in 1987.233 The Adams court noted that the provision of the Act
providing for civil liability, § 2520,234 was amended in 1987 and made part of
the 1986 Privacy Act.235 The amendment added the words “or entity” to those
who may be held liable under the Act.236 The addition of the words “entity”
can only mean a governmental entity because prior to the 1986 amendments,
the definition of “person” already included business entities.237 In order for the
term not to be redundant, the term “entity” necessarily means governmental
entities.238 The Court correctly noted in support of this view that the
amendment added the same language to the civil liability provision for
interception of stored wire and electronic communications under 18 U.S.C. §
2707(a).239 The Court relied on the Senate Committee Report summarizing §
2707, the parallel section for liability for intercepting stored communications,
which specifically states that the word “entity” includes governmental
entities.240
F.

Consequences of Anti-terrorism Legislation on Case Law

On November 18, 2002, the United States Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review reversed a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
3597.

Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
176 F.3d 952.
Adams, 350 F.3d at 985.
Id.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2001).
Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
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Court decision241 involving the application of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA).242 The government, as the sole litigant, appealed a decision by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the FISA court) that set limitations on
orders authorizing electronic surveillance of an “agent of a foreign power.”243
The FISA court’s goal was to ensure that law enforcement officials do not use
the electronic surveillance provisions of FISA for the unlawful purpose of
furthering a criminal investigation, rather than for the intended purpose of
protecting against foreign intelligence.244 In reversing the FISA court’s
decision, however, the Review Court found that the foreign intelligence
element need not be the “primary purpose” for the search, but rather could be a
mere “measurable purpose” of the search.245 The court reached its conclusion
based on the language in FISA as passed by Congress in 1978,246 prior to the
amendment by the USA Patriot Act of 2001.247 This conclusion reverses years
of court decisions, is in conflict with the Fourth Amendment, and opens the
door to abuse of FISA’s authority.
The restriction of “primary purpose” prevents abuses of FISA and gives
the federal government a guide for selecting targets for wiretaps. This newfound absence of such restrictions invites abuse. For example, wiretapping
targets could easily become politically motivated.
Although it is
understandable in the wake of September 11, 2001, to want to grant as much
discretion as possible to the government to prevent future terrorism attacks, the
desire for safety from outside entities must be tempered with a desire for safety
from governmental abuses of civil liberties.
IV. CONCLUSION
In concluding that government entities may be held liable in a civil suit
under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the court in Adams delved
into the circuit split between the Second and Seventh Circuits. Agreeing with
Second Circuit and disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the Adams Court has
basically adopted expanded definitions of “person” and “entity” under the Act
by analyzing the statute’s intent and legislative history.248

241. In re: Sealed Case No. 02-001 (United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review) (decided Nov. 18, 2002) WL 31546991.
242. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000).
243. See FISA, supra note 44 (defining “agent of a foreign power”).
244. In re: Sealed Case No. 02-001, supra note 241, at 4.
245. Id. at 33-34.
246. In re: Sealed Case No. 02-001, supra note 241, at 18. It can be argued that the court
reached its decision to authorize the introduction of evidence obtained prior to the amendment as
the court attacks and rejects the primary purpose requirement.
247. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1.
248. Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
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While Adams correctly held that government entities may be held liable for
violations of the provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, we
certainly have not seen the last of this issue. The circuit split between the
Second and Seventh Circuits, as well as the recent reversal of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court decision249 involving the application FISA,
leaves many issues open for debate and adjudication. In the wake of
September 11, 2001, America’s war on Afghanistan, our strong likelihood of
war with Iraq, and the new developments in anti-terrorism legislation, there is
a strong possibility that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act could be
expanded further to include a jump from municipal government liability to
federal government liability for violations of the Act.
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